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Introduction and summary
The launch of the euro has been accompanied by a
vigorous debate. On the one hand, supporters of a
common monetary policy (for example, Lamfalussy,
1997) have argued that the move to a single currency
is necessary to fully exploit the obvious advantages
of a single market. On the other hand, skeptics have
argued that European Union (EU) economies are too
dissimilar to be subjected to a common monetary
policy. Feldstein (1997) goes so far as to predict that
the political tensions created by the common monetary
policy could lead to another European war.
The debate boils down to a disagreement over
how hard it will be to effectively run a common
monetary policy. There are at least three conditions
that must be met for a common policy to succeed
without causing frictions among the members of the
coalition. First, members must agree on the ultimate
goals to be achieved through monetary policy. This
issue was formally settled through the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty and the ensuing ratification process by national
parliaments, leading to the adoption of a goal of price
stability as the primary objective for the European
Central Bank (ECB).
Second, the common policy will be easier to
implement if the member countries business cycles
are aligned. Monetary policy instruments are macro-
economic variables that work across the board and,
therefore, cannot simultaneously be tailored to diverg-
ing cyclical conditions in the area of their jurisdiction.
However, if different countries or sizable regions are
at different points in the inflation cycle, then assess-
ing the appropriate monetary policy stance becomes
a much more difficult task. Large countries such as
the U.S. constantly confront this problem, but the
degree of economic integration and the availability
of alternative policy instruments to redistribute the
burden of the adjustment are likely to be poorer in
the euro area than in the U.S.1
A third and perhaps more subtle issue is whether
the transmission mechanism operates in a similar fash-
ion across all the countries in the union. In particular,
even if shocks hit all countries equally, their business
cycles are aligned, and there is no disagreement over
whether a response is needed, differences in the trans-
mission mechanism could mean that the appropriate
size and timing of the response are difficult to assess.
Moreover, if the burden of adjustment is not equally
shared across countries, sizable distribution differences
are likely to create political tension.
The issue of how much the transmission mecha-
nism differs across the member states of the monetary
union is just beginning to attract interest. One obvi-
ous difficulty with addressing the question is the pos-
sibility of a regime switch that could have occurred
with the creation of the ECB. It is possible that all
past evidence on the transmission mechanism is no
longer relevant because beliefs about policy will
now differ.
While we concede that this is possible, we doubt
that this institutional change has brought about behav-
ioral changes in a sharp, discontinuous fashion.57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
There is abundant evidence that people adjust their
behavior gradually. In this case, collecting evidence
on how agents operated in the past regime should
provide some information on how they will behave
in the present one.
Even in the absence of structural breaks, however,
trying to conduct the relevant cross-country aggregate
comparisons in the transmission mechanism is fraught
with difficulties. Research on how to identify the
response of a single economy to monetary disturbances
in a convincing and robust fashion is just becoming
available for some countries. There has been very
little work on doing this for multiple countries using
a common framework. In particular, to study the
effects of how a common monetary policy might
matter, one needs to impose a uniform monetary
policy reaction function across countries and to con-
strain exchange rate movements.
Our reading of the existing literature is that this
type of study has yet to be done. As a result, we are
left with a set of only partially comparable findings,
which prevents us from drawing any strong conclusions
about the similarities of the transmission mechanisms
across European countries. A full investigation of
this type would be quite valuable but is beyond the
scope of this article.
We believe, however, that the evidence from
studies conducted at the aggregate level should be
supplemented by systematic comparisons at the micro
level. The richness of the information available at the
micro level should allow us to identify differences in
behavior among different groups of agents in the
same country and similar groups of agents in different
countries. This is important because aggregate differ-
ences could arise for a variety of reasons. One possi-
bility is that similar firms and individuals in different
countries could behave differently. In this case, one
might believe that as institutional arrangements con-
verge, and the single market is fully realized, the dif-
ferences could abate. Alternatively, similar firms and
individuals might act similarly, but the mix of these
agents across countries might differ.
Disentangling true behavioral differences from
differences that are the result of compositional effects
is important for several reasons: first, because doing
so is likely to enhance our understanding of the causes
of the differences; second, because this should lead
to a better assessment of the likely persistence of any
differences; and finally, because this might help iden-
tify policy actions that could be used to partially alle-
viate the differences. Of course, a full investigation of
these issues will require several detailed studies. Here,
we take a first step and present a sort of feasibility
analysis, aimed at assessing whether what appear to
be large structural differences in the economic and
financial structures of the various countries in the
euro area can be expected to lead to differences in
the transmission mechanism.
Our analysis follows three logical steps. First,
we try to identify the types of microeconomic hetero-
geneity that different theories of monetary transmission
suggest could be important. The goal here is not to
compile any evidence on which of these theories is
most important, but rather to use the union of the the-
ories to guide our selection of which cross-country
data we ought to compare.
Next, we collect a number of indicators available
for multiple countries to demonstrate that, along the
dimensions identified in the previous step, there are
sharp cross-country differences in the underlying
microeconomic landscape of the different EU coun-
tries. Theoretically, these firm-level and institutional
differences could alter the aggregate impact of mone-
tary policy.
Finally, having identified many potentially impor-
tant factors suggestive of differences in the transmis-
sion mechanism, we turn to data on one specific
country, Italy, to see what these factors say about busi-
ness cycle dynamics and the response to monetary
policy shocks in that country. If they were to possess
explanatory power in one country, we would read
this result as corroborating the basic idea that the
structural characteristics of the various economies
are relevant factors in explaining cross-country dif-
ferences and similarities of the transmission mecha-
nism. While the analysis is still preliminary and does
not go much beyond a descriptive level, our findings
suggest that microeconomic characteristics of Italian
firms do seem to have considerable predictive power
regarding cyclical fluctuations.
Summing up, we draw three main conclusions
from our analysis. First, there are several good reasons
why previous attempts to uncover the likely effects
of the shift to the common monetary policy have been
inconclusive. Second, looking at the micro data from
different countries can help resolve some of the ques-
tions left unanswered by the studies that have focused
on aggregate data. Finally, in the Italian recession
that followed Italys exit from the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) in 1992, a number of suggestive
differences in investment rates and profitability of
different sets of firms emerge, in line with existing
theories. The next step in our research will be to study
these differences further by refining our indicators,
controlling for the correlation among them, and deal-
ing better with endogeneity problems.58 Economic Perspectives
Prior studies comparing monetary
transmission mechanisms in Europe
A number of recent papers have attempted to
gauge the differences and similarities among the mone-
tary transmission channels of the EU countries. Almost
all these studies rely on aggregate data and analyze the
response to a monetary policy shock displayed by mac-
roeconometric models of the different economies.2
An obvious, preliminary issue is whether any-
thing at all can be learned from the past research.
Indeed, it is certainly possible that the final move to
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is
such a big regime shift that past experience is no longer
a reliable guide.3 However, there is no clear evidence
nor is it likely on a priori groundsthat the regime
shift will lead to a sharp discontinuous break in rela-
tions in the economy. As behavior tends to adjust
gradually, past relationships are likely to retain some
of their predictive value for the near term.
Even in the absence of structural breaks, however,
considerable care is required to translate the knowledge
of the (past) differences and similarities among mon-
etary policy transmission mechanisms in the EU
countries into an assessment of the (future) transmis-
sion mechanisms of the single monetary policy in
the different countries. The move to a single currency
changes significantly the conditions under which
monetary policy operates, making it difficult to inter-
pret most of the empirical evidence on the past trans-
mission mechanisms.
The ideal study, based on past experience,
which would be informative about differences across
countries in the transmission mechanism of a single
monetary policy, would consider the response of
the various EU economies to the same temporal
sequence of monetary policy shocks, holding fixed the
exchange rate among them. In addition, as stressed
by Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi (1998), in the
ideal circumstances it should also be possible to test
the statistical significance of any difference found in
the transmission mechanism. With this benchmark in
mind, we can survey the existing empirical literature
on the European monetary transmission channel.
Studies based on large-scale
macroeconometric models
The existing literature can roughly be classified
into two main groups, depending on whether the evi-
dence is obtained from models of the various econo-
mies that do or do not have a common structure. The
primary findings involving models that do not neces-
sarily have the same structure come from the com-
prehensive Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
project on the transmission mechanisms in the principal
industrialized countries (Bank for International Set-
tlements, 1995). The project simulated the response
of the central banks macroeconometric models to a
common, standardized monetary policy shock (an
increase of the policy rate by 1 percentage point for
two years, with the rate returning to the baseline path
immediately afterwards).
Importantly, the BIS research protocol envisaged
the simulations to be conducted both under unchanged
exchange rates and allowing the exchange rates to re-
act to the move in the interest rate. In the latter case,
two variants were agreed upon: one allowing for an
independent response of each currency and a second
involving a coordinated response of the ERM curren-
cies, with a common pattern of the exchange rate
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Thus, in principle, the
evidence produced within the BIS study complies with
the two main requirements of the ideal experiment.
Unfortunately, however, not all countries in the
study implemented the protocol in its strict form.
Specifically, the variant corresponding to a coordi-
nated response of the ERM countriesprecisely the
exercise that would have been necessary to comply
with the ideal defined aboveis missing for Ger-
many, Spain, and the UK.4 In addition to this limita-
tion, since the BIS study makes use of traditional
large-scale macroeconometric models, it is subject to
the standard criticisms of those models.
In particular, the sheer size of the models and the
lack of fully articulated and consistent foundations in
optimizing behavior can lead to simulation results that
are difficult to interpret. Moreover, one can argue that
many of the equations in these models would fail sta-
tistical tests aimed at assessing their specification.
Similarly, the modeling of the instruments of monetary
policy is often done in an ad hoc way. Collectively,
these problems could distort the picture of how mon-
etary policy operates. Finally, the BIS study does not
allow formal statistical testing of the differences
found, since the models are estimated independently.
Bearing these caveats in mind, the evidence
from the BIS studysummarized for the main euro
area countries in table 15points to some differences,
particularly among large and small countries. In par-
ticular, the gross domestic product (GDP) response is
considerably more pronounced in the larger countries.
Among them, Italy exhibits a slightly larger and defi-
nitely longer lasting response. A second relevant dif-
ference concerns the price response, which is initially
non-negligible only in Italy, the Netherlands, and
Belgium; in Germany, it becomes sizable only after
the first two years, and keeps increasing over the
period; in Austria, the price response is basically nil.59 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Overall, given that the BIS study comes some-
what close to satisfying two of the three conditions
characterizing the ideal empirical study, the differ-
ences identified in this study should be taken seriously.
Moreover, the model used in the BIS study (central
banks models) represents the insider wisdom of
the monetary policy authorities, which is interesting
in itself. However, the lack of a common structure in
the models raises the question of whether any differ-
ences one observes are simply an artifact of different
and arbitrary modeling choices.
Studies imposing a common structure on the
models for different countries
The second group of papers studying the trans-
mission channels in Europe is more heterogeneous.
These studies include evidence from structural vector
autoregressions (Gerlach and Smets, 1995; Barran,
Coudert, and Mojon, 1996; Ehrmann, 1998; Kieler
and Saarenheimo, 1998; Ramaswamy and Sloek, 1998;
and Dedola and Lippi, 1999); from small structural
models with a common structure (Britton and Whitley,
1997); from relatively large multicountry models (the
U.S. Federal Reserve multicountry model in the BIS
study; the models in International Monetary Fund [IMF],
1996, and the European Commission; and Roeger and
Int Veld, 1997); and from prediction equations for
output, estimated for different countries (Dornbusch,
Favero, and Giavazzi, 1998; and Peersman
and Smets, 1998).
The papers using structural vector
autoregressions (SVAR) all try to determine
how a change to one of the variables being
analyzed influences the other variables
under consideration (for instance, how
interest rates might influence investment).6
These papers run into two problems in this
context. First, the shocks to the models
typically differ across countries, both in
terms of size and time path. These differ-
ences make it impossible to make legiti-
mate comparisons among the responses.
This problem is exacerbated because most
models embody different assumptions
about the way in which the monetary
authority responds to new developments
(that is, the endogenous component of
monetary policy). Thus, even on the off-
chance that the same initial disturbance is
analyzed, the monetary policy responses
would not be harmonized so that a sym-
metric response across countries would
not be expected. Instead, the differences in
the assumed monetary reactions would
generate different economic responses, even if the
underlying structure of the economies were similar.7
The second problem in the SVAR literature is a
failure to properly account for the lock-in of the pari-
ties among the currencies in the euro area, which
implies a common response of the exchange rate.
Indeed, the SVARs often do not include the exchange
rate; when they do, the shocks are often inferred in
dubious manner. For instance, the studies we have
seen always assume that a disturbance to interest rates
does not simultaneously influence exchange rates (or
vice versa). Such shocks are hard to imagine since
they imply a free lunch, whereby investors could
move money towards high-interest countries without
expecting to see some of the interest rate gains eroded
by changes in exchanges rates. With the shocks having
been identified in this fashion, it is very likely that
the so-called monetary policy shock is in fact a
combination of shocks, including the endogenous
response to movements of the exchange rate.
As a result of these two problems, much of the
evidence produced by the SVAR literature is of only
limited relevance for the issue at hand, as it does not
appropriately represent the situation that is likely to
prevail in the monetary union. A vivid example of
the difficulties in interpreting the SVAR results is
the Gerlach and Smets (1995) study, in which the
TABLE 1
Compilation of simulation data from BIS study
First Second Peak Last
year year effect year (7th)
Italy GDP –0.18 –0.44 –0.44 –0.12
PGDP –0.13 –0.38 –0.51  0.07
France GDP –0.18 –0.36 –0.36  0.05
PGDP –0.04 –0.19 –0.31 –0.21
Germanya GDP –0.15 –0.37 –0.37   0.11
PGDP 0.03 –0.02 –0.53 –0.53
Netherls. GDP –0.10 –0.18 –0.18   0.02
PGDP –0.08 –0.36 –0.47 –0.16
Belgium GDP –0.03 –0.12 –0.23   0.02b
PGDP –0.13 –0.51 –0.84 –0.55b
Austria GDP –0.08 –0.14 –0.14   0.01
PGDP   0.02 –0.01 –0.05   0.00
aGerman data are not strictly comparable because the exchange rate was
not handled in exactly the same way as for the other countries.
bFifth year after the shock.
Note: Responses of real GDP and the GDP deflator (PGDP) to a 100 basis
point increase in the policy rate for two years, followed by return of the rate
to the normal level (fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis ERM countries; deviations
from baseline in percentage points).
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1995).60 Economic Perspectives
responses to both a one standard deviation, one-peri-
od shock (reported in table 2 as variant 1), and a 100
basis point, two-year sustained increase of the inter-
est rate (variant 2) are presented. In the first case the
response of GDP looks similar across Germany, France,
and Italy, while in the second case, German output
moves by almost twice as much as that of the other
two major countries of the euro area; in the latter
case the German result is also much more persistent
(although this is masked in the table).
Even taking the SVAR evidence at face value,
the results are often ambiguous.8 While many of the
studies tend to conclude that the differences in the
transmission mechanism are not large, the differences
they identify do not seem to be particularly robust:
As summarized in table 2, different studies present
somewhat different rankings of the potency of mone-
tary policy.
The main regularities that do seem to emerge are
that Germany is almost always the country in which
monetary policy is most powerful, often followed by
France, and that monetary policy is always seen as
being more potent in Germany than in Italy, where
monetary policy appears to have the mildest effect on
output. These conclusions are almost the opposite of
the findings from the aforementioned BIS project.
One potential reconciliation is offered by Kieler and
Saarenheimo (1998), who show the extreme indeter-
minacy of the SVAR results: A very large set of widely
different responses of output to monetary policy, each
equally supported by the available data, can be pro-
duced by varying the assumptions used to identify
shocks. Restricting the identifying assumptions to
those that yield impulse responses bounded within a
sort of window of plausibility (for example, the
initial output and price response to a contractionary
shock should not be too positive) still leaves open a
very wide range of possibilities.
Looking at small structural models and multi-
country models, both with essentially the same struc-
ture across countries, none of the studies quite comply
with the requirements set out above. In particular, the
common response of the exchange rate has not been
implemented. The evidence extracted from simulations
of these models points to relatively small differences
in the transmission channels across countries. Aside
from the U.S. Federal Reserve multicountry model
(which generates a much stronger initial response for
Germany and France than for Italy), the other models
show little or no difference in the impact on GDP.
Of course, the identifying assumptions that underlie
these models are subject to the same criticisms leveled
at the national macroeconometric models.
Finally, the studies based on prediction equa-
tions for output have the advantage of having been
devised precisely to provide the sort of ideal evidence
described above. The estimated equations allow the
path of both the monetary policy shock and the ex-
change rate to be common across countries, and the
estimation is done jointly so that formal statistical
testing is possible. On the other hand, the ad hoc
nature of these equations limits ones ability to inter-
pret the results, and doubts can be raised about the iden-
tification of the monetary policy shock. Dornbusch,
Favero, and Giavazzi (1998) jointly estimate an equa-
tion for output growth in each country. The specifica-
tions predict output growth in each country as a
function of its past own values and of past and
present values of growth in the other countries, ex-
pected and unexpected components of interest rates,9
and the bilateral exchange rates with the dollar and
the deutschemark (DM). The specification of the
TABLE 2
Effect of monetary policy on output, using SVARs
Strength of
Study Germany France Italy UK Sweden Netherlands  responsesa
Ramaswamy and Sloek (1998) –0.6 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5 –0.3 –0.6 S<F<I=UK<G=NL
Barron, Coudert and Mojon (1996) –0.6 –0.4 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.3 I=NL<F=UK=S<G
Gerlach and Smets (1995), variant 1 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 –0.6 n.a. n.a. I=F<G<UK
Gerlach and Smets (1995), variant 2 –1.0 –0.5 –0.5 –0.7 n.a. n.a. I=F<UK<G
Ehrmann (1998) –0.9 –0.5 –0.1 0.2b –0.1 0.0 NL<I=S<F<G
Dedola and Lippi (1999)
c –2.2 –1.4 –1.1 –1.4 n.a. n.a. I<UK=F<G
aThese orderings rank the responses according to their magnitude in each study.
bData are not comparable.
cFigures refer to the maximum elasticity to the shock of industrial production.
n.a. indicates data not available.
Effect on GDP one year after shock61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
output equations in Peersman and Smets (1998) is
similar, but they include the German real interest rate
and the differential with the German real rate instead
of the expected and unexpected components of inter-
est rates, and they replace the bilateral exchange rate
against the dollar with the bilateral exchange rate
between Germany and the U.S.; in addition, they
allow no contemporaneous relationships. While the
quantitative results differ in the two papers, they both
point to significant differences in the output responses
of Italy, on one side, and Germany and France, on the
other. In particular, the Italian response is stronger,
a result that is similar to that in the BIS study but
sharply in contrast with the SVAR evidence.10
Summary
The main lesson we draw is that the evidence so
far available is not quite appropriate to assess whether
the single monetary policy will have a differential
impact on the euro area countries. Moreover, the results
are not robust: Methodological differences (such as
which variables are included in the models and how
shocks are identified) change the conclusions quite
substantially. With the relevant exception of the out-
put equations, one regularity is that models with a
similar structure tend to yield small differences in the
transmission mechanisms, whereas models with a
more idiosyncratic structure tend to show larger dif-
ferences. However, it is unclear whether, on the one
hand, the similarities in the former case are forced by
the choice to impose the same structure on (truly) dif-
ferent economies or whether, on the other hand, the
differences in the latter case result from the choice
of modeling as different economies that are (truly)
similar. It should nonetheless be acknowledged that,
though far from being conclusive, the two pieces of
evidence that most closely comply with the requisites
for the ideal experimentnamely the BIS study
and the output equationsprovide roughly consistent
results and point to noticeable differences in the
transmission mechanisms.
Microeconomic evidence on the structure of
European economies
The ambiguity of the macroeconometric findings
on differences in the transmission mechanism undoubt-
edly stems, at least in part, from the poor design of
the existing studies. Further work to remedy these
problems should help to substantially clarify matters.
We believe, however, that one additional reason for
the inconclusive findings of these studies is their reli-
ance on aggregate data. Relevant differences in the re-
sponse to a monetary shock might be observed among
different groups of agents in the same country, similar
groups of agents in different countries, or both. How-
ever, the relative weights of these groups could differ
across countries, in which case aggregation problems
will confound attempts to make sense of the evidence.
Therefore, we propose to supplement the macro-
level analysis with an exploration conducted at the
micro level. Focusing on micro data has two further
advantages. First, by identifying the behavioral re-
sponses of sets of agents that have been grouped ac-
cording to different structural characteristics, this
approach provides the information needed to uncover
the causes of whatever differences might be present
at the macro level. Second, it might help identify
possible policy interventions or natural mutations
which, by altering the microeconomic landscape
in the relevant ways, could lead to more uniform
effects of the common monetary policy.
We consider four different theories of how mon-
etary policy can affect the economy. These theories
identify the characteristics of the various economies
that should determine the potency of monetary policy.
While we recognize that these theories of monetary
transmission share some common featuresfor
instance, most require that prices do not instantly
adjust to changes in monetary conditionswe con-
sider it useful to highlight the differences among the
theories rather than the similarities. Once we have iden-
tified the salient characteristics, we can see whether the
member countries of the monetary union differ along
these dimensions.
Theories of monetary policy transmission
The textbook model of monetary transmission
supposes that open market operations matter because,
in the presence of temporarily fixed prices, altering
the mix of money and bonds changes the real value
of the money supply. This leads to a shift in interest
rates to clear the money market and, subsequently, to
changes in spending on interest sensitive items. Since
this mechanism operates in a host of models ranging
from the IS/LM to cash-in-advance or limited-partic-
ipation models, we refer to it as the conventional
mechanism. We take its central prediction to be that
the potency of monetary policy across countries will
depend on the cross-country variation in the interest
sensitivity of spending (see Kakes, 1999, for further
discussion).
A second theory of monetary transmission builds
on the interest rate mechanism by assuming that financ-
ing difficulties can amplify the impact of the initial
change in interest rates. Capital market distortions in-
duce lenders to require collateral before they will make
funds available. Because any interest rate increase
lowers the value of future cash flows, collateral is62 Economic Perspectives
influenced by open market operations, and this is
assumed to alter the availability of funds and ultimately
spending. We call this the borrower-net-worth mech-
anism (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). We take the
central prediction of this theory to be that debt capac-
ity will depend on borrowers net worth and this will
drive spending.11
A third, and closely related, theory emphasizes
the role of banks. This theory posits that an open
market sale matters because it removes reserves from
the banking system; this in turn impairs banks abili-
ty to make loans. For some customers a cut in bank
lending is assumed to translate into reduced spending.
Thus, the theory requires that both banks and bank
customers have financing problems that are exacer-
bated when a monetary tightening is undertaken
see Stein (1998) for a formal model and Kashyap
and Stein (1997) for a discussion in the context of
the EMU. This channel is really a special case of the
borrower-net-worth channel since it focuses on the
importance of the availability of funds from banks;
to highlight this we call it the bank-lending channel.
We take its central prediction to be that the potency
of monetary policy will depend on the degree to which
banks are able to raise alternative funds to offset reserve
fluctuations and the extent to which consumers and
firms must rely on banks for their financing.
A final mechanism, which has a long history in
discussions of monetary policy transmission, focuses
on the non-price methods of allocating credit. For
instance, Roosa (1951) argued that monetary policy
could be quite potent without moving interest rates
by influencing the availability of credit. The net-worth
and bank-lending mechanisms described above are
special cases of this theory, in that they assume that
contracting difficulties influence credit allocations in
a particular way. Alternative versions of the credit-
rationing hypothesis would permit factors beyond net
worth and collateral to influence credit availability.
For example, in the seminal Stiglitz and Weiss
paper (1981), equilibria in which credit is rationed
are possible because of asymmetric information be-
tween borrowers and lenders that leads to problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection. Williamson
(1987) studies the implications for lending of an im-
perfect ability to monitor borrowers. He shows that
a rationing equilibrium may exist in which interest
rates are no longer allocative; instead lenders adjust to
shocks by changing the amount of credit they extend.
Working out the precise implications for mone-
tary policy transmission is difficult because the credit
allocations can differ depending on the modeling
assumptions. However, one robust prediction from
these models is that credit rationing becomes increas-
ingly likely and widespread in economies with less
efficient legal systems, more opaque borrowers
activities, and weak enforcement of contracts.12 Thus,
we also report data comparing the economies along
these dimensions.
Microeconomic data describing different
economies in Europe
Collectively, these theoretical considerations
suggest a number of structural features that would be
useful to compare across the European economies
that are operating with a common monetary policy
(or, in the case of the UK, are considering joining the
union). Finding comparable data on the relevant indi-
cators for all 11 countries that adopted the euro is quite
difficult, so our preliminary exploration focuses on
seven countries with readily available data.13  The
proxies shown in table 3 are intended to provide some
evidence on the differences in interest sensitivity,
collateral positions, importance and availability of
bank loans, and the costs of contract enforcement.
First, we review the findings for the different indica-
tors. Then we draw some tentative conclusions about
individual countries.
One factor that is common to all the theories is
some form of imperfect price adjustment. If prices
adjust more quickly to monetary impulses in some
countries rather than others then this would lead to
different patterns of output adjustment. Thus, an
obvious starting point for comparisons would be
the degree of price rigidity across countries.
A major problem with this tack is the uncertainty
over how pricing practices may change once prices
in the euro area are quoted in the same units. One
of the benefits often cited by the advocates of the
single currency is that it will increase competitive-
ness of product markets, which will tend to equalize
prices and price-setting practices across countries.
To the extent this is true it raises questions about
how much faith to put in past evidence on pricing
policiesthis is one case where a sharp change in
behavior seems possible.
Nevertheless, we can probably gain some insight
into the price rigidity issue by looking at labor mar-
ket frictions. Labor costs account for a major portion
of total costs and it is generally agreed that legisla-
tion governing the hiring and firing of workers in
Europe makes wages relatively rigid. Moreover, the
move to a single currency will not directly (or imme-
diately) change the contractual framework governing
the labor market. Thus, we report data on labor markets
as a first measure of structural differences.63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 3
Selected characteristics for European countries
Country
Variable UK Germany Italy France Spain Netherlands Belgium
Employment protectiona 0.9 2.6 3.4 2.8 3.1 2.2 2.5
(rank, 26 OECD countries) (2) (20) (23) (21) (22) (13) (16)
Capital output ratiob 1.99 4.0 3.2 3.0 n.a. n.a. 3.0
(Investment/GDP) (0.154) (0.223) (0.180) (0.191) (0.212) (0.197) (0.181)
Fraction of financing
that is short termc 0.960 0.593 0.838 0.893 0.925 0.620 0.882
Exports outside EU-15
relative to GDP
d 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.29
Firms’ leverage 63.1 52.0 52.3 46.3 53.5 43.9 51.4
 (median) %e (60.5) (61.0) (62.5) (49.1) (56.4) (63.7) (58.4)
Median number of
employees per firmf 1,128     406    251    357    267     205   363
Household indebtnessg 1.020 0.779 0.314 0.510 0.580 0.649 0.415
Months to repossessh 12 15 48 11 36 2.5 24
Repossession cost
as % of house valuei 4.75 6 19 15 10 11 19.5
% of firms with single bankj 22.5 14.5 2.9 4 1.5 14.3 0
Market capitalization
relative to GDPk 1.65 0.48 0.46 0.65 0.69 1.53 0.94
Average bank size,
billions of dollarsl 24.9 12.8 12.3 20.1 10.2 32.1 22.3
% of  total deposits in
5 largest banksm  27.0     14.0    40.4    68.8    39.8     81.3   61.0
aOECD (1999b), summary indicators of strictness of employment protection, table 2.5.
bStock of capital at current prices divided by value added at current prices in 1996. The stock of capital is computed by
the perpetual inventory method from OECD, 1999; the investment to GDP ratio is calculated from the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics, using the reported data on gross investment and GDP , in current dollars, averaged from 1992 to 1996.
cRatio of current liabilities to total liabilities minus equity in 1996 from Enria (1999).
dOpenness of EMU members from Favero and Giavazzi (1999)
eFirms’ leverage is total debt divided by total debt plus net capital in 1996 using the sample of firms from Amadeus
from Enria (1999).
fMedian of the mean of industry-level employment built by Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) using raw data from Eurostat.
g1994 total household liabilities as a fraction of disposable income from BIS (1995).
hNumber of months (as of 1990) necessary to repossess collateral in case of default on a mortgage from European
Mortgage Federation.
iLegal costs to repossess collateral in case of default on a mortgage as a percentage of the value of the house in 1990
from European Mortgage Federation.
jShare of firms entertaining only one bank relation from Ongena and Smith (2000).
kMarket value of firms listed on major exchanges as of year-end 1998 divided by GDP from Federation of European
Stock Exchanges Annual Report, with GDP data from the OECD.
lIBCA Bankscope database for European banks; figures pertain to total assets as of 1997 year-end.
mShare of deposits of five biggest credit institutions in 1996 from European Central Bank (1999).
n.a. indicates data not available.
The first row in table 3 shows summary infor-
mation on employment protection legislation in dif-
ferent countries. Taken from the June 1999
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) Employment Outlook, the data rep-
resent a weighted average of indicators pertaining to64 Economic Perspectives
regular labor contracts, temporary contracts, and collec-
tive dismissals. The levels of these averages therefore
have no direct economic interpretation, but the rankings
for the main 26 OECD members are informative.
The data confirm the well-known finding that
labor market institutions in the UK are much more
flexible than in the rest of Europe. The amount of
employment protection in the other countries (except
possibly in the Netherlands) is fairly similar. If one
believes that labor market frictions are going to be a
key determinant of future cross-country differences
in wage and price flexibility, it would appear that the
differences among the continental economies will not
be too large.14
Turning to the specific theories, trying to find
evidence on interest sensitivity of spending one runs
into many of the same econometric difficulties dis-
cussed in the last section. In particular, determining
whether results are driven by ad hoc specification
choices or true behavioral differences is not easy.
Therefore, the evidence we provide should only be
considered a first pass at the issue. We try, however,
to assess the robustness of any inferences that we might
draw by providing several indicators that should be
closely related to interest sensitivity.
One measure we consider is the ratio of fixed
capital to output. Countries with high levels of capital
to output will (assuming they are close to a long-run
desired level) have higher investment requirements.
We expect that interest rate changes should matter
more in high-investment countries. Looking at the
data in the table we find three groups of countries:
Germany, which has a very high level of capital; the
UK, which has a relatively low level; and the remaining
countries, which lie in between (although they are
closer to Germany than to the UK). The numbers in
parentheses below the capital-to-output ratio are aver-
age levels of investment to GDP between 1992 and
1996 from national income account data. These num-
bers essentially confirm that the British and German
differences are not due to the vagaries involved in
estimating the stock of capital. By this metric, mone-
tary policy should have strong output effects in
Germany, while it should have much more modest
effects in the UK. The other countries, except possibly
the Netherlands, should be in between.
As a second indicator, we look at data on the
maturity structure of debt. Countries with mostly short-
term debt can expect changes in interest rates to affect
borrowing costs more rapidly than countries with
mostly long-term debt. The data again show that
Germany and the UK are the two polar cases, although
the ranking of monetary policy potency is reversed,
with German firms having much more long-term debt
than British firms.15 Aside from the Netherlands, which
also has a relatively low fraction of short-term debt,
most of the other countries debt-maturity structures
are closer to the UK than to Germany.
The negative correlation between the debt maturity
and the capital-to-output ratio is not too surprising. If
there are any frictions in borrowing and lending, then it
may be desirable to match the maturity of any debt to
the life of the asset. Therefore, it makes sense that in
Germany, with its higher level of fixed (long-term)
assets, the fraction of long-term debt is also higher.
A slight extension of the conventional model
would allow interest rates to be important because of
their impact on exchange rates. With a single mone-
tary policy this channel no longer directly matters for
trade within the euro area. However, it will retain its
relevance if there are differences in trading patterns
with countries outside the euro area. Data on the ratio
of exports to GDP outside of the 15 countries in the
EU are reported in table 3. It appears that the four
large countries are much more likely to trade outside
of the EU than the smaller countries. This pattern is
probably going to persist and should mean that, all
else equal, monetary policy should have more potency
in the larger countries than in the smaller countries.16
The net-worth channel suggests that we look for
differences in collateral levels. We consider three
proxies. One measure is the leverage of firmsin par-
ticular, the ratio of debt to debt plus equity. The data in
the table show that there is relatively little variation
across countries in this dimension. Except for France,
the median firm has a leverage ratio of between 0.56
and 0.64. The French firms have less debt, and one
possible interpretation of this observation is that they
have more borrowing capacity. Alternatively, the lack
of debt may reflect problems with contract enforce-
ment; we discuss this interpretation below.
The data on leverage are for a sample of large
firms, including those listed on public stock markets.
It is quite plausible that borrowing frictions are more
important for smaller, non-publicly traded companies.
Therefore, we also report data from Kumar, Rajan,
and Zingales (1999) on firm size (in which firms are
weighted according to the total employment in enter-
prises of a given size).17 In terms of the size of the
median firm, there are three groups of countries.
The typical UK enterprise is much larger than those
found on the Continent. The Italian, Dutch, and
Spanish firms are relatively small, while the remaining
countries have middle-sized firms. These figures sug-
gest that collateral considerations should be strong
in Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain and much weaker
in the UK.65 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The last of the proxies we consider is household
debt levels, more specifically the ratio of household
liabilities to disposable income. Once again, the UK
stands out, with borrowing levels far exceeding those
found elsewhere. Italy stands out as the country with
the lowest household borrowing, although Belgium
also shows quite low levels.
One possible interpretation of these data is that
Italian and Belgian households should at least be able
to borrow to make up any income shortfalls. But the
alternative interpretation is that households in these
countries are less willing to borrow. Past research
analyzing cross-country savings patterns, however,
favors the former interpretation (Jappelli and Pagano,
1989, and Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese, 1994).
Furthermore, two proxies related to contract
enforcement suggest these patterns reflect differences
in the efficiency of credit markets, rather than differ-
ences in households willingness to borrow. One of
these indicators is the number of months needed to
repossess collateral in the event of a default. The
second measure is the estimated legal costs of repos-
sessing a house in the event of a mortgage default
(expressed as a percentage of the value of the house).
Both variables suggest that enforcement costs are high
in Italy and low in the UK.
Thus, one would expect much less mortgage
debt in Italy than in the UK and, hence, much lower
overall borrowing. These considerations lead us to
interpret the debt data as a measure of the depth of
local capital markets. On the one hand, the Italians
are less able than the British to smooth out shocks to
consumption, since their capital markets are not as
well developed and will not be able to rely as much
on borrowing. On the other hand, being less leveraged
than the British, the Italians are less vulnerable to
shocks to interest rates.
Belgium and, to some extent, Spain also appear
to be countries where contract enforcement is rela-
tively costly. Interestingly, the Belgian, Italian, and
Spanish legal systems are all derived from the French
legal system. As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997) note, creditors rights to reorganize
or liquidate firms are relatively weak in the French
system. In contrast, Germany appears to be relatively
efficient by these measureswhich also accords with
La Porta et al.s findings. This suggests that credit
rationing is more likely to occur in Belgium, Italy,
and Spain than in Germany or the UK. However, as
mentioned earlier, this could strengthen or weaken
the impact of monetary policy.18
Finally, as proxies for the bank lending channel
we report several measures of bank loan demand and
loan supply (see Cecchetti, 1999, for further data).
Our data show that in all the countries, it is typical
for large firms to have several banks. This should
help insulate them from a credit crunch that might
result if an individual bank gets into trouble. Smaller
firms appear to be more likely to rely on a single bank,
although, to the best of our knowledge, it is not pos-
sible to get comparable data for small firms. There-
fore, the previously described data on the variation in
average firm size will be relevant for the lending
channel too. From the lending channel perspective,
this suggests that the reliance on bank funding is
likely to be highest in Belgium, Italy, and Spain and
lowest in the UK.
A second indicator of the importance of banks
for the funding of businesses is the size of the capital
market. Judging by the ratio of the value of shares
traded on the major public stock exchanges to GDP,
there is striking variation in the depth of capital mar-
kets across countries. Particularly in the UK, but also
in the Netherlands, there are many huge publicly
traded companies. These companies almost always
have access to some types of nonbank finance. In
contrast, in Germany and Italy the stock market capi-
talization is relatively low, a feature supporting the
commonly held view that the banks dominate the
financial system in these countries.
In terms of bank loan supply, Kashyap and Stein
(1999) find that in the U.S. smaller banks lending is
more closely tied to monetary policy than that of
large banks. This suggests that shifts in bank loan
supply are more likely if a countrys banking system
consists mostly of small rather than large banks. One
way to make this comparison is to look at differences
in the absolute size of banks in the different countries.
Table 3 shows the average size of the banks in the
IBCA Bankscope database for European banks in
each country in 1997. This database provides infor-
mation on the largest banks in each country, covering
institutions that grant between 80 percent and 90 per-
cent of domestic credit. By this yardstick the Belgian,
British, Dutch, and French banks are best positioned
to insulate borrowers from changes in credit avail-
ability; the German, Italian, and Spanish banks are
relatively small and therefore may not be so well
able to guarantee funding for their clients.
The data in table 3 also show the share of total
banking deposits in the top five banks. Focusing on
concentration may be appropriate if one believes that
the lack of integration of the banking markets is likely
to persist, and if the largest banks in each country are
expected to be able to attract funds during a credit
squeeze, even if some of the banks may not be large66 Economic Perspectives
in an absolute sense. Interestingly, except for the UK,
this size measure suggests the same classification of
countries as implied by the absolute measure of size;
in the UK the many nonbanking financing options
and the large absolute size of the leading British banks
lead us to suspect that shifts in bank loan supply
would be relatively less important.
Summary
Obviously, the data in table 3 are open to multiple
interpretations, and the connections between some of
our proxies and the ideal variables suggested by theory
are sometimes loose, but we feel that several general
conclusions are warranted. First, there do seem to be
fairly strong differences across the countries in sever-
al respects. Moreover, the indicators do not seem
likely to change quickly. Therefore, if these features
do matter for monetary transmission, it seems likely
that the differences will be in place for several years.
The Italian economy appears to be one in which
several of the theories would predict a strong effect
of monetary policy on the economy. In relative terms,
Italy has a fairly high fixed-capital stock, poor con-
tractual enforcement, lots of small firms, rigid labor
markets, and many small banks operating within a
financial system that has been bank-dominated. All
of these factors suggest comparatively strong effects
of monetary policy.
The UK looks to be almost the opposite of the
Italian case. There is relatively little fixed capital, good
contract enforcement, very flexible labor markets, and
many large firms with genuine alternatives to nonbank
financing. The only common feature between the two
countries is that they both do a significant amount of
trading with non-European countries.
Most of the other countries sit in the middle, with
characteristics that, according to which theory of
monetary transmission one considers, indicate stronger
or weaker effects of monetary policy. For instance, in
Germany firms are relatively large and contract en-
forcement is pretty good, which should help to insu-
late firms from monetary policy. However, Germany
also has a high level of investment, fairly rigid labor
markets, and exports a significant amount of goods
to countries outside of Europe. France has more large
banks and a more developed stock market than
Germany, but corporate leverage and household
borrowing in France are much lower, and it is fairly
costly to repossess collateral.
Cross-firm differences in cyclical
performance in Italy
Ultimately, it will take a number of studies and a
considerable amount of work to determine which of
the factors identified above are most important for
the transmission of monetary policy. As a first step,
with the intent of providing a sort of benchmark and,
at the same time, assessing whether the characteris-
tics highlighted above do indeed matter, we explore
how firms that differ along those dimensions have
fared in the wake of a monetary tightening. We focus
on the one country, Italy, in which a priori we are
most likely to observe strong effects of monetary
policy. We believe that subsequent work can try to
narrow the alternatives and, more importantly, pin-
point whether the factors that may have been signifi-
cant in Italy are also relevant in other countries.
Macroeconomic conditions in Italy in the 1990s
Before we investigate the microeconomic evidence
in Italy it is necessary to describe the macroeconomic
environment. Table 4 shows a set of macroeconomic
indicators for 198997, the period for which we have
good firm-level data. The period is marked by consid-
erable volatility, much of which is attributable to the
developments leading up to the adoption of a common
monetary policy. The year 1992 was a watershed year.
Growth in the three preceding years had been rela-
tively rapid, although the economy was gradually
slowing down. While the primary deficit had im-
proved, the overall deficit was still around 10 percent
of GDP. In 1991 the total deficit deteriorated slightly
and reached 10.8 percent in 1992. This situation put
downward pressure on the exchange rate (which was
fixed as part of the ERM).
Over the next year a number of policy changes
aimed to help ease the pressure on the lira. In July
the government adopted a 30,000 billion lire (about
2 percent of 1992 GDP) fiscal tightening, which ulti-
mately proved to be insufficient to ease pressure on
the exchange rate. In September, the government
decided to abandon the attempt to maintain parity
with the DM and the exchange rate started floating
freely: It jumped from 756 lire to the DM in August
to 806 lire in September and 882 in October, a deval-
uation of 15 percent from the previous central parity.
From then on the exchange rate continued to fall,
though the devaluation had, overall, relatively small
effects on the price level.
To stabilize the exchange rate, interest rates were
sharply increased and (perhaps more importantly) a
second, remarkably large set of fiscal measures were
announced at the end of 1992. Collectively, these
changes reduced spending by approximately 92,000
billion lire (6 percent of GDP). The fiscal adjustment
marked a clear break: In 1993 the primary deficit
climbed to 2.6 percent of GDP. This was also a year
of deep recession, with industrial production falling67 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
by 2.4 percent and GDP down 1.2 percent. However,
recovery began quickly; in 1994 industrial production
increased by 5.2 percent and GDP by 2.2 percent.
Due to the combination of the sharp devaluation
(which greatly benefited export-oriented firms) and
the tight fiscal policy (which heavily affected firms
with a domestic market), the recession and the subse-
quent recovery were unevenly distributed. This is rel-
evant in interpreting some of the latter results. As table
4 makes clear, 1993 also saw a marked slowdown in
credit availability. Total credit to the economy grew
by 7.6 percent, almost two-thirds its growth rate in
the previous year. Though this slowdown can partly
be explained by a reduction in demand, it is likely
that access to credit became more difficult.19 The
recovery continued in 1995, while at the same time
the exchange rate depreciated sharply. As the dollar
tumbled in the wake of the Mexican crisis, and con-
cerns arose over the domestic political situation, the
lira depreciated sharply in February and March. Inter-
est rates were then increased temporarily. The two
subsequent years saw a marked slowdown followed
by a mild recovery. At the same time, under pressure
to fulfill the Maastricht criteria for admission to the
monetary union, the government tried to speed up
Italys fiscal adjustment and, in 1997, the primary
surplus reached 6.7 percent of GDP, allowing a total
deficit of 2.7 percent.
Firm-level comparisons over the last
ten years in Italy
To further examine the potential importance of
microeconomic heterogeneity in the monetary
transmission mechanism we report some simple di-
agnostics about investment and profitability for dif-
ferent sets of Italian firms. On the one hand, this task
is complicated by the odd mixture of shocks, described
above, that have hit the Italian economy since 1992.
On the other hand, the shocks were very large and,
therefore, have the potential to yield some clearly
visible results. Ultimately, much more work will be
needed to carefully identify and quantify these dis-
turbances and to keep track of their impact on firms
performances. In the meantime, we hope that these
exploratory tabulations may provide some guidance
about which contrasts deserve further investigation.
The data that we analyze are drawn from the
Italian Company Accounts Database, a large dataset
collecting balance sheet information and other items
on a sample of over 30,000 Italian firms. The data,
available since 1982, are collected by Centrale dei
Bilanci, an organization established in the early 1980s
jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Association of Italian
Banks, and a pool of leading banks to gather and
share information on borrowers. Besides reporting
balance-sheet items, the database contains detailed
information on firm demographics (including year
of foundation, location, type of organization, owner-
ship status, structure of control, and group member-
ship), employment, and flow of funds. It also reports a
firms credit score, computed directly at the Centrale
dei Bilanci to help banks in screening borrowers.
Balance sheets for the banks major clients (defined
according to the level of their borrowing) are collected
by the banks.
TABLE 4
Macroeconomic conditions in Italy, 1989 to 1997
Full year October
Variable 1989 1990 1991 1992 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Lira/DM exchange rate 729.7 741.6 747.7 790.0 881.92 950.7 994.7 1,138.0 1,026.3 982.2
(% depreciation) (–1.54) (1.63) (0.82) (5.67) (16.1) (20.33) (4.63) (14.41) (–9.82) (–4.29)
Real GDP growth, % 2.9 2.2 1.1 0.6 n.a. –1.2 2.2 2.9 0.7 1.5
3-month Treasury
bill rate, %  12.65 12.28 12.66 14.48 15.51 10.47 8.84 10.73 8.61 6.40
Domestic credit
growth, % 14.85 13.14 12.67 11.71 11.75 7.60 6.22 5.10 4.68 4.21
Government primary
deficit/GDP , % 1.1 1.7 –0.1 –1.9 n.a. –2.6 –1.8 –3.9 –4.5 –6.7
Total government
deficit/GDP , % 9.8 11.1 10.1 9.6 n.a. 9.5 9.2 7.7 6.6 2.7
Notes: The exchange rate devaluation in October 1992 is with respect to the exchange rate in August 1992.
Credit growth for October 1992 is relative to October 1991. n.a. indicates not applicable.
Sources: Bank of Italy, 1997 and 1992, Annual Report.68 Economic Perspectives
The focus on the level of borrowing skews the
sample toward larger firms (which also means that
trade and service sector firms are underrepresented,
while manufacturing firms are overrepresented). Fur-
thermore, because most of the leading banks are in
the northern part of the country, the sample has more
firms headquartered in the North than in the South.
Finally, since banks are most interested in firms that
are creditworthy, firms in default are not in the dataset,
so the sample is also tilted towards higher than average
quality borrowers. Despite these biases, the sample
still has much broader coverage than most datasets
analyzed by economists since it includes thousands
of unlisted companies and many very small firms
for example, the median firm in the sample in the
early 1990s had only 26 employees.
The first panel in table 5 shows the evolution of
investment and return on assets (ROA) for the median
firm in the full sample. The major macroeconomic
developments described in the last section are clearly
reflected in this Company Accounts Database. In partic-
ular, profitability and investment were highest in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. The 1993 recession also
is easy to spot, as investment plunged and profitability
sagged. By the end of the period investment had recov-
ered, although profitability remained depressed.
However, the data for the median firm mask some
stark differences across segments of the economy. The
size panel in the table contrasts small firms (defined
as having fewer than 50 employees) and large firms
(more than 500 employees). Small firms generally
have higher profit rates, as measured by return on
assets (ROA), than large firmsthis is not surprising
given the larger failure rates of such firms. The smaller
firms also have a lower investment rate, partly because
these firms are less likely to be in capital-intensive
industries.
For our purposes, however, the differences around
the 1993 recession are most relevant. For large firms
the recession was rather mild; the investment rate fell
by about 20 percent and profitability dipped slightly.
For small firms the declines were much steeper: Invest-
ment dropped by more than 40 percent and ROA also
declined by more than 1 percentage point. As late as
1996, small firms ROA had not returned to the 1992
level, whereas large firms profitability had recovered
by 1995. Thus, it appears that smaller firms fared
worse than larger firms in this episode.
The export propensity panel of the table com-
pares firms based on their exports as a fraction of their
sales. Interestingly, prior to 1992 there was virtually
no difference in profitability (ROA) between the
high export sensitivity firms (whose exports account
for more than 30 percent of sales) and the low export
sensitivity firmsalthough the investment rates were
higher for the high-export firms. The two groups,
however, fared quite differently during the recession.
For the typical low-export firm, investment virtually
ceased in 1993 and was down nearly 25 percent in
1994; profits also dropped sharply. For the 10 percent
of firms that were heavily export-oriented, profits
were unchanged and investment dropped a bit but
had fully recovered by 1994.
Given the large devaluation it is not too surprising
that the exporters outperformed the domestic sellers,
but we find the magnitude of these differences sur-
prising. We explore these differences further below.
Note that the strong exchange rate effects reinforce
the concerns raised earlier about the importance of
properly accounting for the impact of the single cur-
rency on the exchange rate when studying the trans-
mission mechanism.
Another obvious contrast to consider is the degree
to which firms are dependent on banks for their fund-
ing. The interest rate spike in the fall of 1992 and the
subsequent recession severely affected the strength
of Italian banks balance sheets. For instance, the
percentage of nonperforming loans rose from about
14.6 percent in 1992 to 22.5 percent in 1993 and then
peaked at 31.1 percent in 1994, before dropping back
to pre-crisis levels. Given the degree of the banking
problems and the usual lending channel considerations,
studying borrowers bank dependence seems particu-
larly appropriate.
Unfortunately, the institutional arrangements in
Italy make developing a measure of bank dependence
difficult. The standard approach in most studies is to
compare firms that have access to public capital mar-
kets (for example, firms that are listed on a stock
exchange or have publicly traded bonds) with firms
that have little or no access. However, the underde-
velopment of Italian capital markets means that es-
sentially all firms have been bank dependent (for
example, less than 0.5 percent of the firms in the
sample are listed and these firms account for less
than 8 percent of total sales in the sample). Thus, any
measure of the amount of bank borrowing scaled by
firm size tends to uncover relatively profitable and
creditworthy firms rather than high-risk firms that are
extremely reliant on banks. One challenge for further
work on monetary transmission in Italy and other
countries with underdeveloped capital markets will be
to find better proxies to study bank dependence.20
The bank-dependence indicator we use in this
study is whether a firm belongs to a corporate group.
These alliances are quite important in Italy. Our69 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 5
Investment and profitability for different sets of Italian firms
(data for median firm)
Category 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
All firms NF 34,379 36,009 37,436 37,326 36,883 39,280 42,814 34,772 32,114
I/A 2.29 2.02 2.05 2.07 1.77 1.12 1.43 2.00 2.30
ROA 8.52 8.52 8.14 7.35 7.39 6.44 6.22 7.18 6.53
Size
Small NF 23,933 25,330 26,312 26,023 25,618 27,178 29,828 21,421 18,849
I/A 1.62 1.37 1.55 1.59 1.35 0.77 1.06 1.41 1.66
ROA 8.62 8.72 8.38 7.60 7.67 6.60 6.33 7.27 6.63
Large NF 780 804 797 842 793 782 780 798 847
I/A 4.83 4.74 4.18 3.85 3.43 2.79 2.84 3.74 3.72
ROA 7.88 7.36 6.53 6.16 6.00 5.76 5.58 6.43 6.17
Export
propensity
High NF 3,656 4,153 4,363 4,243 3,608 3,438 4,259 4,380 4,744
I/A 3.98 2.82 2.63 2.73 2.40 2.33 2.75 3.83 3.41
ROA 8.49 8.49 8.03 7.37 7.59 7.63 7.50 8.95 7.32
Low NF 30,723 31,856 33,073 33,083 33,275 35,842 38,555 30,392 27,370
I/A 2.20 1.91 1.98 1.99 1.70 0.10 1.30 1.75 2.10
ROA 8.53 8.52 8.15 7.35 7.37 6.31 6.05 6.92 6.39
Group
membership
Nonmember NF 6,764 7,753 8,633 9,091 9,762 10,616 11,131 8,930 8,415
I/A 3.14 2.62 2.58 2.53 2.09 1.62 2.06 2.84 2.79
ROA 9.39 9.16 8.78 7.86 7.88 6.91 6.69 7.90 6.95
Member NF 5,184 5,683 6,344 6,732 7,134 7,906 8,383 8,003 7,385
I/A 3.15 3.03 2.75 2.53 2.17 1.53 1.76 2.20 2.36
ROA 8.36 8.21 7.48 6.69 6.54 5.74 5.78 6.76 6.25
Interest
coverage
High NF 28,701 29,585 29,641 28,451 27,032 29,156 34,141 27,910 25,765
I/A 2.59 2.31 2.36 2.40 2.12 1.37 1.72 2.43 2.67
ROA 9.41 9.41 9.08 8.41 8.60 7.53 7.08 8.18 7.43
Low NF 5,678 6,424 7,795 8,875 9,851 10,124 8,673 6,862 6,349
I/A 1.02 0.99 1.04 1.19 0.97 0.57 0.57 0.71 1.08
ROA 2.04 2.63 2.53 1.85 2.17 1.42 1.01 1.70 1.79
Interest
sensitivity
High NF 10,189 10,653 11,118 11,092 11,046 11,140 11,643 8,826 7,831
I/A 2.51 2.32 2.28 2.23 1.76 1.30 1.52 2.31 2.58
ROA 8.54 8.72 8.38 7.61 7.48 6.50 6.10 7.11 6.54
  Low NF 11,070 11,459 11,894 11,823 11,598 12,170 13,440 11,168 10,358
I/A 3.11 2.74 2.72 2.69 2.35 1.51 1.90 2.37 2.71
ROA 8.19 8.05 7.70 7.07 7.14 6.41 6.15 6.84 6.22
Location
North NF 23,247 24,279 24,931 24,828 24,801 26,465 29,254 24,486 22,988
I/A 2.57 2.32 2.36 2.29 1.94 1.27 1.58 2.27 2.50
ROA 8.85 8.72 8.23 7.34 7.34 6.54 6.38 7.54 6.70
South NF 4,590 4,958 5,193 5,120 4,943 5,212 5,567 4,203 3,648
I/A 1.57 1.24 1.42 1.57 1.19 0.63 0.94 1.21 1.70
ROA 7.47 7.66 7.25 6.72 6.78 5.36 5.03 5.28 5.53
Notes: I/A is investment in fixed capital during the year divided by year-end assets; ROA is return on assets;
and NF is the number of firms. Sample splits are defined in the text.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Italian Company Accounts Database.
working definition of a group member is whether the
firm reports that it is controlled by a holding company.
The holding companies for these groups typically
have access to reliable funding through large banks
and the capital markets, and operate an internal capi-
tal market for their group members. For instance,
Bianco et al. (1999) find that member firms investment
is less sensitive to cash flow than that of nonmember70 Economic Perspectives
firms. Thus, group membership may be an indirect
proxy for firms that are not susceptible to a bank
credit crunch. Conversely, the firms that classify
themselves as independent are likely to be highly
reliant on bank financing.
The group membership panel in table 5 com-
pares member firms with nonmember firms.21 In terms
of investment, the typical member and nonmember
firms are almost identical until 1993; only in the last
three years of the sample do any differences appear
and in these years the member firms invest less. The
member firms also show consistently lower ROA than
the nonmember firms. However, it does not appear
that the member/nonmember distinction explains
very much of the movement in ROA around the 1993
recession. For both sets of firms, ROA drops (by fairly
similar percentages) and recovers by 1995. Overall, it
does not appear that splitting the sample based on
group membership is very informative.
One reading of the borrower-net-worth theory is
that balance-sheet conditions should determine the
cyclical sensitivity of different firms. We separated
the firms whose required interest payments exceed
their operating income (and operating income is pos-
itive)the most extreme evidence of an impaired
financial condition.22 When we compare them with
the remaining firms, the distressed firms show low
levels of investment and ROAundoubtedly these
firms have some real problems with operating efficien-
cy beyond their financial troubles. The recession was
particularly harsh for the firms that had interest cov-
erage problems. Investment dropped by more than
40 percent, while profitability was down by more
than one-third. Certainly, this is consistent with the
predictions of the net-worth models, but these firms
having been hit by real shocks (perhaps the same
ones driving the business cycle) might also be a plau-
sible explanation.
According to the traditional theory of monetary
transmission, interest sensitivity is the key indicator
of which firms will adjust the most during a monetary
tightening. As a crude proxy for interest sensitivity,
we sort firms according to their industry. We classify
firms in the construction sector or that produce capi-
tal goods, durable goods, and intermediate goods
used in the production of investment goods as highly
interest sensitive. The low interest sensitivity firms
produce nondurable consumption goods or interme-
diate goods needed for nondurable consumption goods.
We exclude agricultural firms, service sector firms, util-
ities, and other firms for which we could not make a
clear classification based on their industrial code.
The interest sensitivity panel in table 5 shows
investment and profitability for these firms. There do
not appear to be noticeable differences for these two
sets of firms around the recession. For both types of
producers, investment and ROA drop noticeably in
1993. In percentage terms, the drop in investment is
larger for the low-sensitivity firms, but the opposite is
true for ROA. Furthermore, in the next year invest-
ment recovers more for the nondurables producers,
while the ROA drop is again bigger for the durable
good producers. By 1996, investment for both sets of
firms had moved back to early 1990s levels. Overall,
we see no clear pattern to the changes for these firms.
The location panel of table 5 compares firms
based on whether their headquarters are in the north-
ern or southern part of the country.23 The southern
firms are generally considered to operate in an envi-
ronment that is less conducive to efficiency, are more
generally dependent on government subsidies, and
are typically less export-oriented. We would expect
the combination of the fiscal contraction and high
interest rates during the recession to have a more
potent effect in the South than the North. The data
confirm our conjectures. The southern firms begin
with lower ROA and a lower investment rate, and
show extreme drops in investment and profitability
in 1993. The ROA for the southern firms remains
low through 1996.
While these simple comparisons can be mislead-
ing, we believe we can safely draw several overall
conclusions from table 5. First, information on export
sensitivity seems essential to understand the 1993
Italian recession. More than any other factor, export
sensitivity appears to isolate the firms that suffered
the most. In addition, firm size appears to be impor-
tant. In line with many theories, small firms had a
more difficult time managing the recession. Similarly,
firm location seems to matter. For the other factors,
we consider the results rather mixed.
The obvious next step is to jointly control for the
various features that we have identified. A full-blown
regression analysis will eventually be needed; at this
point, we prefer to keep the analysis simpler and
shorter. As a robustness check and first step towards
simultaneously allowing for alternative factors, we
report several four-way sample splits. We first con-
trol for export propensity and then separate the firms
along other dimensions. These tabulations allow us
to see the extent to which all the table 5 results may
be driven by export patterns.
The results in table 6 confirm that while exports
are indeed important, they do not seem to be the
whole storyto save space the table only shows the71 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 6
Category 1991 1992 1993 1994
Size
  Small firms
    High export NF 2,191 1,932 1,612 1,861
I/A 1.80 1.68 1.52 1.88
ROA 7.69 7.98 8.23 7.90
    Low export NF 23,832 23,686 25,566 27,967
I/A 1.56 1.32 0.72 1.00
ROA 7.59 7.64 6.49 6.22
  Large firms
    High export NF 178 111 161 202
I/A 4.91 3.96 3.36 3.63
ROA 4.20 4.46 5.83 6.92
    Low export NF 664 682 621 578
I/A 3.62 3.42 2.64 2.51
ROA 6.39 6.29 5.73 5.22
Interest sensitivity
  High
    High export NF 1,786 1,519 1,441 1,768
I/A 2.84 2.36 2.27 2.52
ROA 7.60 7.66 7.55 7.40
    Low export NF 9,306 9,527 9,699 9,875
I/A 2.10 1.67 1.14 1.35
ROA 7.62 7.45 6.32 5.86
  Low
    High export NF 1,502 1,529 1,148 1,472
I/A 2.57 2.47 2.26 2.75
ROA 7.19 7.57 7.71 7.72
    High export NF 10,321 10,339 11,022 11,968
I/A 2.71 2.33 1.42 1.78
ROA 7.03 7.05 6.22 5.95
Group membership
  Nonmember
    High export NF 1,278 1,175 1,216 1,478
I/A 3.13 2.66 2.56 2.92
ROA 7.77 8.07 7.94 7.73
    Low export NF 7,813 8,587 9,400 9,653
I/A 2.40 2.01 1.51 1.95
ROA 7.88 7.85 6.78 6.53
  Member
    High export NF 976 835 970 1,321
I/A 3.26 2.81 2.72 3.07
ROA 6.90 7.13 7.10 2.38
    Low export NF 5,756 6,299 6,936 7,062
I/A 2.41 2.05 1.37 1.50
ROA 6.76 6.47 5.53 5.52
Interest coverage
  High
    High export NF 3,655 3,164 3,156 3,983
I/A 2.96 2.54 2.44 2.86
ROA 8.04 8.17 8.17 7.87
    Low export NF 26,261 27,201 29,349 32,318
I/A 2.27 1.9 1.16 1.49
ROA 8.32 8.32 7.26 6.84
  Low
    High export NF 588 444 282 276
I/A 1.43 1.29 1.21 1.42
ROA –0.99 –1.23 –2.84 –2.52
    Low export NF 6,822 6,074 6,493 6,237
I/A 1.11 0.90 0.46 0.46
ROA 1.34 –0.03 –1.05 –0.30
Notes: I/A is investment in fixed capital during the year divided by year-end
assets; ROA is return on assets; and NF is the number of firms. Sample splits
are defined in the text.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Italian Company
Accounts Database.
Investment and profitability, controlling for
export propensities
 (data for median firm)
four years around the recession. In particular,
we draw five conclusions from this table.
First, in all but one case (discussed further
below) the high-export firms do noticeably
better than comparable low-export firms.
Second, among the low exporters, small
firms fare worse than large firms. Hence,
size is not simply standing in for exporting
tendencies. Third, the previous ambiguous
results involving the comparisons of dura-
ble goods and nondurables producers do
not become any clearer after controlling
for exports. Among the domestically fo-
cused firms, both the interest-sensitive and
interest-insensitive firms experience com-
parable declines in investment and ROA.
Fourth, the group membership results
remain mixed. Perhaps one can conclude
that the low export group member firms
did slightly worse than comparable non-
member firms; however, these differences
are not very pronounced.
Finally, table 6 indicates that the results
for interest coverage appear to involve
more interesting interactions with exporting
patterns than the other comparisons. The
high-export firms with coverage problems
actually underperform the non-exporters
in terms of ROA, though their investment
is less affected by the recession. Also, the
drop in investment among non-exporting
firms is not too different in percentage
terms between the high- and low-coverage
firms. Further study of this interaction
is needed.
Conclusion
Our three main findings are as follows.
First, the existing attempts to assess the
likely effects of the shift to a common
monetary policy are not very informative.
The main problem is that no one has con-
ducted a careful examination of what would
happen if the euro system countries were
subjected to the same temporal sequence
of monetary policy shocks, holding fixed
the exchange rate among them. This is the
key constraint that will be imposed by the
common monetary policy, and we simply
do not know how different the responses
would be across countries. Some work
to fill this gap in the literature would be
quite valuable.72 Economic Perspectives
Second, there are good reasons to believe that
looking carefully at microeconomic data across
countries might provide some insights about the
transmission mechanism. Looking at some of the
microeconomic structural differences among several
European countries, these countries appear to differ
significantly along many dimensions that are poten-
tially relevant for the transmission of monetary policy.
For instance, conditions in Italy and the UK look to
be very different.
Finally, drawing on micro data for a specific
country during a particular episode, we find that
NOTES
1See Kouparitsas (1999) and Carlino and DeFina (1998) for some
statistical evidence on this point. Supporters of the monetary
union argue that the launch of the euro will result in an increase
in the degree of synchronization of the business cycles of the
member countries. However, there are theoretical arguments sug-
gesting that synchronization could increase or decrease. For ex-
ample, Krugman (1991) shows how synchronization can depend
on productive specialization. If the monetary union makes it easi-
er for countries to specialize in production for certain sectors then
countries may become less harmonized. Alternatively, if intra-
industry trade increases this can lead to greater synchronization.
2Surveys of the literature can also be found in Kieler and Saarenhe-
imo (1998), Dornbush, Favero, and Giavazzi (1998), Gambacorta
(1999), and Kouparitsas (1999).
3For an interesting version of this argument, see Frankel and Rose
(1998), who discuss how the changing trade linkages that might
follow a shift to a single currency could alter the output correla-
tions across countries.
4We include the UK in the analysis since it may join the union
at a later date. The lack of comparable data forced us to drop
Greece from the analysis.
5Data for Germany are not strictly comparable, as they refer to an
experiment in which the exchange rate moves vis-à-vis all countries.
However, owing to the specific pattern for the exchange rate as-
sumed in the ERM-coordinated experiment, the changes in the
effective exchange rate are roughly the same as in the other coun-
tries (stronger in the last years of the experiment). Spain is not in-
cluded in table 1 as the changes in the effective exchange rate in
the experiments performed are not comparable with those of the
other countries.
6The SVAR relates a set of variables to lags of the variables. For
instance, investment and interest rates could be assumed to be
determined by past values of investment and interest rates. See
Kouparitsas (1999) for a further discussion of how the inference
is conducted.
7The article by Gerlach and Smets (1995), among the first on the
subject, explicitly recognizes this point and complements the
standard impulse responses with responses to a prespecified path
for the interest rate (this is equivalent to hitting the model with a
sequence of shocks appropriately chosen). However, aside from
Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), subsequent papers have ignored
the issue. As we argue below, this can be quite important.
8We focus here on the output comparisons mainly for conve-
nience; the price responses are often not reported. We would not,
however, expect them to be any more uniform than the patterns
for GDP.
9In the preferred equation, only the expected part of interest rates
is retained. The expected rate is constructed to be near a target
level which is a function of exchange rate, GDP, and inflation
deviations from target levels that vary across countries.
10Peersman and Smets find the response in Belgium is also stronger
than in other countries, contradicting the BIS study.
11This theory is sometimes called the credit channel (or the broad
credit channel) of monetary transmission.
12It is possible that a monetary policy contraction will be more
potent in countries with poor legal enforcement. For instance, in
the Williamson (1987) setup, low monitoring costs increase the
possibility that the equilibrium involves no rationing, and in these
equilibria interest rates on loans change but quantities do not re-
spond to monetary policy. In rationing equilibria, which are more
likely with high monitoring costs, a tightening will affect loan
quantities but not prices.
13See Cecchetti (1999) for a similar exercise that focuses more on
financial and legal differences.
14There is considerable pressure and a countervailing strong
amount of resistance to reforming labor market institutions in
most European countries, including Spain, Italy, France, and
Germany. Reform is moving slowly so that in relative terms the
European labor markets are still fairly rigid. One factor for the
slow adjustment is the tendency to temporarily suspend a general
practice in a particular set of circumstances rather than completely
rolling back the general practice.
15Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that the German treatment of
pension obligations can inflate the liabilities figures for German
firms. We do not believe that this effect is very important for
this sample.
16For all the countries, the fact that some primary commodities
are priced in dollars could mean that a change the euro/dollar
exchange rate could cause fluctuations in input pricesof course,
this has been true historically as well.
17These data are the medians across industries in each country. The
industry average levels of employment are calculated by weighting
firm size by the fraction of industry employment in each firm.
differences among firms that are related to the ob-
served differences across countries do matter for the
cyclical pattern and the response to shocks, including
monetary shocks. Our analysis is mainly descriptive.
Further work needs to be done to improve the meth-
odology and obtain better measures of a number of
relevant firm characteristics. However, our explor-
atory findings suggest that similar exercises using
micro datapossibly extended to householdsfrom
other countries could be quite valuable in helping us
to understand the nuances of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.73 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
18Cecchetti (1999) conducts an intriguing exercise in which he
relates the La Porta et al. measures of shareholder rights, creditor
rights, and the ability to enforce contracts on measures of the im-
pact of interest rates on output and inflation. He finds that varia-
tion in the legal code does seem to partially explain why the
potency of monetary policy varies. One difficulty for our purposes
is that the interest rate sensitivities he uses come from models
that do not account for the exchange rate restrictions discussed
in the last section. These correlations also involve non-European
countries. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that enforcement
costs and legal structure do matter for monetary transmission.
19An annual Bank of Italy survey on a sample of manufacturing
firms collects information on the access to bank credit. Specific
questions are asked as whether firms applied for loans and were
rejected by the bank(s), even if they were willing to pay the mar-
ket rate and possibly even accept an increase in the cost of credit.
Guiso (1998) shows that the share of firms that were turned down
at the end of 1992 and 1993 were 9 percent and 12.8 percent,
respectively, compared with an average of about 3 percent in
the previous years.
20One proxy that we experimented with is the number of banks
with which a borrower has contact. In Italy it appears that firms
with a single bank do exhibit the characteristics that one might
expect for bank dependent borrowers. However, the propensity to
use multiple banks is very high, so it is possible that this screen
may not generalize to other countries. Within Italy using this
variable is also complicated by the need to merge the company
accounts data with another data source, which means many firms
end up being dropped from the analysis.
21Unfortunately, many firms do not classify themselves as either
belonging to a group or as being independent, so we exclude
these firms from the comparison.
22The exact classification is that low-coverage firms have a posi-
tive level of gross operating margin, but a ratio of gross operating
margin which is less than the interest payments on their outstand-
ing debt.
23Northern firms are located in one of the following regions:
Valle dAosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Trentino
Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, and Emilia Romagna. South-
ern firms are from the following regions: Abbruzzo, Molise,
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, and Sardegna.
The remaining firms are in the central region and are excluded
from this comparison.
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